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ThehistoricaldevelopmentandeconomicimpactofpharmaceuticalsintheUKarenowadays
reasonablywell documented.That industryhas become themostprofitableand fastgrowing
of the country’s high-tech industries. Its member firms undertake more than one-fifth of the
national research and development (R&D) activities, one half being carried out in Britain,
and currently achieve a £2.4 billion favourable trade balance with the rest of the world.
However, all too little is known about one sub-set of the industry, namely the veterinary
medicine sector, and the measures it took to evolve new therapies for improving the health
care ofanimals. The presentarticle seeksto bridgethat knowledge gap. To be sure, that sector
wasfordecadesrelativelyinsignificantwhencomparedwiththehuman-basedindustry.Then
inthe1950s,itbegantogrowinimportanceasthemeansofensuringaplentifulsupplyofmeat
and dairy products to all income groups. From the 1980s, the pharmaceutical content of feed-
stuffs diminished and by 2000, a radical change in the industry’s structure had taken place,
after pharmaceutical giants had handed over work on animal medicines to specialist firms.
Intheearlyyearsofthe twentieth century, questionsofanimalhealth inBritaintooksec-
ond place to the protection of human health. The Veterinary Department of the Board of
Agriculture controlled epidemics such as foot-and-mouth disease by slaughter and move-
ment restrictions. However, it did set up a diagnostic laboratory at Wembley in 1893 for
brucellosis (abortion in cattle) and planned a Central Veterinary Laboratory at Weybridge
for broader scientific research into such diseases.
Even so, the authorities failed to encourage the development of medicines to treat the
approximately one per cent annual loss of livestock through a wide range of disorders. Farm-
ers, for their part, judged that it cost less to put down sick animals, or alternatively used
primitive methods of varying efficacy that could well inflict severe pain. At a time when the
UK had some 1.5 million horses, external hurts were often neglected, while owners believed
that it was sufficient to keep their constitutions healthy with laxative horse balls and powders.
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361Britain’s largest veterinary medicine producer was Cooper of Berkhamsted, which
made a dip powder for the parasitical sheep scab. Yet poor home demand compelled it
to export ninety per cent of that product, mainly to the British Empire or honorary
dominions such as Latin America. Other firms and institutions pursued a more advanced
path, basing their work on that of Continental scientists, such as Pasteur in France and
Koch in Berlin, inventors of vaccines and sera to cure or ward off diseases. Those bodies
included the Lister Institute in London and Evans & Co. of Liverpool (later Evans Med-
ical), which collaborated with that city’s Institute of Comparative Pathology.
One very active manufacturing firm was Burroughs Wellcome of London, founded by
two American-born entrepreneurs. In 1912, it offered its first veterinary product, an anti-
tetanus serum. A few years later, its Physiological Research Laboratory set up a veterin-
ary department, well advanced in investigating brucellosis in cattle and canine distemper
when the First World War broke out in 1914.
The UK government soon grasped the crucial economic and strategic wartime impor-
tance of some animal species. In a pre-mechanisation era, Britain’s army needed a total
of 1.4 million horses, for transporting soldiers and hauling military equipment from the
railheads to the battlefront. Thus, outbreaks of parasitic mange or bacterial glanders
would have catastrophically disrupted the country’s war effort. Thousands of vets were
therefore recruited to administer appropriate remedies; the authorities later decided that
it was more economical to put down diseased horses than to attempt their cure.
Then in 1918, an economy-driven government withdrew its wartime financial support
from farmers, causing a prolonged agricultural depression that hampered improvements in
animal healthcare. Thus, only a few British firms pursued research in this field. Wellcome,
as Burroughs Wellcome became in 1924, did identify the organisms causing certain animal
diseases, for which it developed vaccines. British Drug Houses also introduced some useful
anti-parasitic drugs.In1925, Cooper,newly mergedwithits rivalsMcDougall & Robertson,
remainedtheleadingspecialistproducer,withannualsalesof£550,000.Thatcomparedwith
Wellcome’s total turnover of £1.4 million, mostly from sales of human medicines.
The limited veterinary activities of British firms in the home market were supplemented
by branches of overseas, mainly American, multinationals. In 1930, the estimated value of
thecountry’sanimalmedicineoutput,at£329,000,cametonomorethantwopercentofthe
pharmaceutical total. By then, there were enough firms operating in Britain, namely thirty-
threein1935,forthemtoformatradeassociation,asthenucleusofafutureindustry.How-
ever, any hoped-for breakthrough in animal therapy was still to come.
That breakthrough, creating opportunities to treat effectively far greater numbers of
animal diseases than previously, arrived in the form of entirely novel medicines. In
1937, May & Baker invented the sulpha drug, M&B 693, three years later offering vari-
eties suitable for animals. The drug cured both the prime minister, Winston Churchill, of
pneumonia in 1943 and the Royal Circus lion, Nero, in the following year. The antibiotic
era rapidly followed, its development hastened by the pressure of the Second World War.
After 1945, Britain’s agriculture industry was to enjoy far more thriving conditions than
hitherto.Thegovernmentintroducedplanstoassistfarmersandotherswithsubsidies,encoura-
ging improvements in the health of livestock. It arranged for vets to receive greater scientific
training than hitherto. As early as 1946, Wellcome, having established a Veterinary Research
station in Sussex, was the first producer in the world to use penicillin for curing streptococcal
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362mastitis in cows. Veterinary medicine output therefore quadrupled in value, from pre-war
levels of around £600,000 to £2.3 million in 1948. However, that represented only a marginal
increasefrom2.7 to3 percentoftherapidlyexpandingoverallpharmaceuticaloutput,boosted
as it was by intensive demand for human usage of sulpha drugs and antibiotics.
In the 1950s, a striking development took place in the role of Britain’s veterinary med-
icine sector, which would take on a wholly new function. For some decades there had
been ambitious projects, most notably in Continental Europe, to develop novel systems
of animal management. That entailed the herding together of livestock on a vast scale
in order to raise and maintain them with the minimum of labour and other costs. How-
ever, a side-effect of these moves was to permit the spread of infectious diseases, which
scientists would be expected to control with the aid of powerful medicines.
For Britain, a potentially lucrative target would be poultry, which in 1955, after the end of
rationing, provided only one per cent of all meat products consumed.For most people, chicken
as a dish was then a relative luxury; the aim would be to make available both whole birds and
separate portions, such as legs and breasts, cheaply enough to be accessible to even the least
well-off. Since American agriculturalists were already converting live poultry into dead meat
on anindustrialscale, itneeded aBritish pioneertofollow suit. Thatwas to be Geoffrey Sykes.
Having trained at US colleges and production sites, Sykes devised three stages in
this conversion process. First,young chicks were hatched in huge hatcheries. Second, birds
wererearedinextensivefactory-likebuildings,thenumbersallowingbothscaleeconomies
andthemonitoringofgrowthandslaughterweight.Third,onceslaughtered,birdswouldbe
plucked and drawn in a fully mechanised sequence of assembly-line operations.
Inevitable violent behaviour in these overcrowded sheds was countered by such mea-
sures as de-beaking and feeding male birds with female hormones in order to tranquillise
and fatten them. The equally predictable infections had to be treated by a cocktail of
drugs. Antibiotics were quickly recognised to possess growth-promoting properties.
American pharmaceutical corporations, with their longer experience of intensive animal
rearing, had already evolved appropriate products, which British and European rival
companies soon attempted to challenge with their own brands. Likewise, the leading
UK feed producers were now adding pharmaceuticals to vitamins as supplements to their
feedstuffs, some forming joint ventures with pharmaceutical firms.
The grocery chain Sainsburys encouraged Sykes and a few notable followers, such as
Antony Fisher and Colonel ‘Streak’ Corbett, to move from supplying broiler chickens
alone, to offering wrapped portions suitable for individual purchase in supermarkets.
However, during the final processing stage, raw chicken sections were apt to putrefy, a
problem initially met by spraying them with antibiotics. That measure left a substantial
residue in the meat, potentially harmful to consumers.
Bythe1960s,the‘poultryrevolution’causedtheoutputofanimalmedicinesalmosttotri-
ple in value between 1958 and 1968, by which time it accounted for a record twelve per cent
of pharmaceutical production. Over that period, the share of poultry in British households’
meat consumption also tripled. Given such opportunities, the leading UK-owned drug com-
panies were greatly extending their veterinary operations through acquisitions.
Wellcome merged with the Cooper, McDougall & Robertson combine, linking its
own biological strengths with Cooper’s reputation in anti-parasitic medicines. Beecham,
having invented its pioneering semi-synthetic penicillins, soon began to offer brands for
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feedstuffs company, followed by the purchase of a leading French medicinal firm. Glaxo,
already running a specialist animal department, acquired Allen & Hanburys, later conso-
lidating their respective veterinary research programmes.
Asinthe1930s,thesecompanieswereupagainsttheUKbranchesofpowerfulandfarmore
experiencedAmerican corporations.Theseserved theUSveterinary medicinemarket, which
was now five times the size of the British. In the absence of any product data, it is significant
thatin1970,Merck’s$69millionandEliLilly’s$61millionoverallR&Doutlaysdwarfedthe
combined research total of $38 million of the three British leaders mentioned above.
Within a decade, British companies were beginning to have second thoughts about
remaining in the animal medicines market. Hailed as giants at home, in global terms they
were no more than middle-rankers, vulnerable to take-over or market erosion from foreign
rivals. To join the world drug top table, the only feasible course would be wholesale mer-
gers and ridding themselves of all non-core activities, not least the veterinary ones. Human
beings belonged to just one species.By contrast, the animal kingdom comprised many spe-
cies, subject to an enormous range of diseases. Moreover, regulatory changes in the 1970s
and 1980s forced farmers to reduce the amount of growth-promoting pharmaceuticals in
animal feedstuffs. Thus, in 1987, Britain had nearly 3,000 veterinary medicines on sale,
withaverage annualturnover ofnomorethan£40,000.Thetaskofresearchandproduction
of animal remedies should properly be in the hands of smaller specialist companies.
The first company to follow that route towards divestment was Boots, which merged its
veterinary interests with those of Fisons, selling all of them in 1983 to outsiders. Four years
later, Wellcome disposed of all its veterinary assets to a US firm, Pitman Moore, which
soon afterwards took over those of Glaxo as well. Beecham initially moved in a different
direction by a merger of equals in 1989 with the US SmithKline, its joint veterinary hold-
ings initially ranking fourth in world markets. However, within six years SmithKline
Beecham’s veterinary department was contributing no more than seven per cent to its total
output, with profit margins steadily declining. It was then sold off to Pfizer.
By 1992, the value of UK veterinary medicine output, at £225 million, was only 2.6 per
cent of the pharmaceutical industry’s £8,531 million. Almost half that sector’s sales were
to treat companion animals – or pets and horses for leisure – as against only two-fifths for
livestock.Thereremainedthirty-fivespecialist producers basedinthe UK,the marketleader
being Merial Animal Health, a combination of Merck’s and Rho ˆne-Poulenc’s veterinary
units. Its headquarters was in Britain, but almost all the other specialists were either Ameri-
can- or European-owned. Despite veterinary medicines accounting for nearly one-fifth
in the increase in the wider pharmaceuticals’ sector output during the period 1948 to 1968,
and so making a major contribution to the emergence of the celebrated UK pharmaceutical
industry outlined at the beginning of this article, by the end of the century, veterinary
medicines once again became essentially an insignificant branch of the wider industry oper-
atingintheUK,andalmosttotallyinsignificantamongBritish-ownedpharmaceuticalsfirms.
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